The Indian corporate bond market is still developing, and as such there are some peculiarities that might not be found in a matured market. This paper describes the state of development and key obstacles to further development. It reveals some unusual market behaviour and patterns from available statistics. In particular, primary and secondary market activity clusters around a small number of issuers and issues, with some resulting distortions. Some of the unusual patterns can be explained by market factors, and others remain puzzling. Despite a few unusual artifacts, statistical analysis verifies that the Indian corporate bond market largely maintains expected pricing relationships with ratings, maturity, optionality and industry type.
Global bond market stood at US$95trillion as of 2010 out of which 70% were accounted by domestic bonds. The US was the largest market with 38% of the value outstanding, followed by Japan 20%. Government bonds accounted for 57% of the outstanding value of domestic bonds in 2010. Greece's credit rating has been downgraded a number of times. Other countries with high budget deficits such as Portugal, Ireland, Turkey, Italy and Spain have also seen downgrades. Increasing concern about the ability of some governments' to repay their debt, has resulted in a significant widening of government bond yields. Recently, 10-year Spanish Government bonds reached the 6% mark, which is considered very high. According to Dealogic, book runners' deal volume from global debt capital markets totalled $6.05 trillion in 2010, down 2% from the previous year but nearly 40% up on the volume two years earlier. In relation to the size of the economy, in Europe, public sector debt is highest in Greece (134% of GDP), Italy (119%), Portugal (91%) and Ireland (87%). Net government debt is set to increase in the next few years due to the high level of projected government borrowing in many countries. The US corporate bond markets have long been an important source of capital for issuers, with daily trading volume of $16bn and more than 400 mutual funds investing in US highyield bonds.
Discussion on Indian corporate bond market has been going on for ages and in each and every forum, the need for developing the corporate bond market as an alternative funding arrangement is well understood and acknowledged. Both the Government and Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) have set up many Groups, Committees, and Forums to study and discuss the issue for finding out a workable solution. The Late Dr. R H Patil Committee report (2005) presented a reasonable solution and roadmap for kick-starting this form of the market to fulfill the future needs of the Industry in funding investment. Almost 7 years have passed after the report was made public but not much headway has been achieved. Some of the issues like unification of stamp duties on creating charges for securitized debt have been contentious issues and no solution has been found to take this market to the place where it belongs. Unlike other countries, a large chunk of corporate funding in India is done through banking, retained earnings and capital through equity offerings. Corporate bonds contribute fairly little in terms of long term funding. Most of the studies on Indian bond market centered on issues pertaining to the market microstructure issues and other bottlenecks in the market specifically cost related ones.
Recently, Government introduced specialized regimes for a corporate bond market in the infra sector. Government allowed tax benefits (Budget, 2010) on infra investment upto a limit for tax payers. Key motivation for investing in debt market is tax saving for tax payers.
The paper tries to understand the basic structure of Indian corporate Bond market, legal and regulatory issues delaying the development of the corporate bond market in India, its issuance and trading behavior, pricing of risk, structure of probability of default of the corporate bonds, the behavior of credit spread. The paper is divided into the following sections: Section 1 gives the brief background to develop corporate bond market in Emerging market like India; Section 2 gives Regulatory and Operational Framework of Indian Corporate Debt Market; Section 3 discusses about Market Participants from both Supply side and demand Side and challenges they face; Section 4 discusses about some of the challenging issues with respect to data and market structure; Section 5 discusses about current market dynamics; Section 6 discusses the structure of probability of default in corporate bonds in India; Section 7 analyses the corporate credit spread for AAA rated securities and Section 8 draws the final conclusion of the study.
In any economy, equity and debt are two useful sources of financing for corporates. It caters to investors having different risk appetites and requirements. When a firm cannot finance its activities solely through equity, it must look at debt financing to support its activities and support development and growth (Allen, Kraakman and Subramaniam, 2009 ). Equity investors have generally a smaller time frame of investment but debt investors are long term investors in a firm. This debt is funded through bank loans and bond issuances. A liquid bond market helps an economic entity to raise funds at cheaper cost vis-à-vis syndicated loan from banks (Mishkin, 2006) . The liquid bond market helps investor to convert their holdings into cash as there are others who would like to take the risk of investing in bonds if the return is appropriate for them to assume such risk. The secondary market trading also provides important information not only on price but also on many other factors like credit risk appetite, spread, default probability, etc. The tradability of bonds issued by an issuer helps the market in getting required information on the firm (Mishkin, 2006) . Further, development of Credit Default Swap (CDS) market globally also helped in unbundling the risk and reselling the same at appropriate rate. In India, CDS market has been introduced but lacks liquidity.
In India, most of the financial markets like equity, equity derivatives, currency derivatives, commodity derivatives, Government bonds, money and currency market including OTC currency derivatives, OTC interest rate derivatives are relatively well developed while corporate bond market is not well-developed This is in contrast to other developed and emerging markets in the world. India's corporate bond market, about 30 percent the size of China's, is failing to expand at the rate analysts say is needed for the government to meet its target of building infrastructure. India has about $200 billion of corporate bonds outstanding (Bloomberg) compared with China's corporate bond market of $614 billion, according to Asian Development Bank figures (2011). The corporate bond market has been wary of the large government borrowing program crowding out the market and a new SEBI law on rollover of limits limiting FII participation. SEBI introduced restrictions on rollover of limits if bonds are sold before maturity. FII's who have filled up the corporate bond limits and want to sell the bonds will not be able to buy them back as they have to apply for fresh limits from the regulator. Both SEBI and RBI allowed FIIs to invest in long term unlisted NCDs issued by companies in the infrastructure sector Infra Bonds provided that the Infra Bonds have a minimum residual maturity of five years and are subject to a minimum lock-in period of one/ three years during which the FIIs will be allowed to trade amongst themselves but cannot sell to domestic investors and are subject to certain prescribed limits. The recent tussle on tax issues between FII's and the government is also hurting sentiments on FII investments in bonds. A weakening Rupee does not help either, as a weak currency is a deterrent for investments in debt by FII's. The government has set the cumulative debt investment limit in corporate bonds (including Infra Bonds) for FIIs at US$45 billion and at US$15 billion in government securities.
Corporate bonds account for about 2% of GDP (Khanna & Varottil, 2012 ) and equity market is many notches ahead of corporate bond market in 1. Corporate Bond Market Need:
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this regard. Total issuances have been far lower than the Government securities issuances in India (Table  -1) .
Secondary market has remained relatively illiquid vis-à-vis the Government securities market. Other markets in India have grown in terms of their trading activities while corporate bonds have remained dormant with lower level of activity (Table 2) .
In a recent paper on Indian corporate bond market, Khanna & Varottil (2012) have brought out few impending legal issues that have been coming in the way of developing corporate bond market in India.
• Contract Enforcement: Given the Indian legal system's unusual delay in giving appropriate relief to enforce the contract of debt with regard to payment of periodic interest, enforcing collaterals against the debt, bankruptcy, etc. poses serious challenges to attract right kind of investors in the corporate debt market. Prohibitive cost of bringing civil action is also another deterrent (Krishnan, 2010 , Khanna, 2010 . Borrowers take advantage of the situation in denying remedies to the lenders. World Bank has consecutively ranked India for the last two years at 182 and 183 against the parameter of enforcement of contracts (Doing Business Report, World Bank, 2012). Source: SEBI, CCIL; * indicates data upto Dec 2011, ** indicates Dated securities and 364-day T-bills, *** indicates large number of issuances were re-issued Government securities Note: 1 Crore means 10,000,000 (10 million) and in India, April to March is followed as a Financial Year -08  19079  95890  188843  1653851  757074  3133665  139889  12059579   2008-09  22683  148166  245964  2160233  837520  3758904  143221  12919070   2009-10  38230  401198  316956  2913890  883949  2988971  170703  21614207   2010-11  44060  605274  332540  2870952  1150037  4191037  172792  16359029   2011-12  51439  591979  412266  3488203  1283178  4642573  173755  14919125 Source: SEBI, CCIL
Regulatory and Operational Framework of Indian Corporate Debt Market:
• Insolvency Regime: Liquidation process (an important provision of debt contract) is fraught with significant delays and can take up to 10 years for a company (Shroff & Puri, 2006) . B o a rd f o r I n d u s t r i a l & F i n a n c i a l Reconstruction (BIFR) has been unsuccessful in ensuring timely recovery and rehabilitation (Shroff & Puri, 2006) . The Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR) scheme introduced by RBI to bypass the unusual legal delays in judicial system has not been very successful either (Bhoir, 2012) . Foreign lenders are not covered under the scheme. The insolvency regime is spread over several pieces of legislation and among different course and regulatory bodies and this poses serious challenges and does not sound to be cost effective. In a recent communique to the Banks from Government of India in April 2012, it has advised banks to restrict exposure to quasi securities like convertible preference (Cumulative Convertible Preference Shares (CCPS)) shares that have a long tenure, low returns and high provisioning. During 2011-12, distress loans of 6697crores were converted into quasi-equity as against 562crores in the previous year.
• Standardization and Transparency: It is imperative in a financial market that investors have sufficient information to price an asset while trading the same. Disclosure standards should be standardized in a manner that brings transparency to the instrument. In India, foreign investors have to follow a different set of guidelines vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts. The current regime is considered insufficient and further steps need to be taken to make the market more attractive to all investors (Adikesavan, 2011 These requirements are not expected to have any major impact on the Securitization or assignment of any underlying asset class, as these are relatively easy to comply with. The biggest impact of the Guidelines is expected to be on Direct Assignment transactions that formed about 75% of the market in FY2012. Under the Guidelines, no credit enhancement is permitted for these transactions. Given the prohibition on credit enhancement, the investing banks will be exposed to the entire credit risk on the assigned portfolio, which most banks may not be comfortable with. Hence, the volume of such assignment transactions is expected to be severely affected.
Market Participants:
There are supply and demand side issues in the corporate bond market. The most important supply side issue is dominance of governmentowned companies in the market. The debt market in India is dominated by the Government in terms of huge issuances. The high level of Government borrowing is crowding out the corporate sector to some extent (Luengnaruemitchai & Ong, 2005) . During the last few years, Government borrowing in India has been on the rise at an average rate of about 19% during the last 6 years or so. The borrowings have increased after the onset of the financial crisis and during 2011-12, the percentage growth of borrowing has surpassed earlier years ( Table -3 ).
The gross borrowing of the Government through dated securities alone stood at 5,10,000 rores, Cash Management bills accounted for 93,000 rores. 91-day T-Bills accounted for 4,46,803 rores, 182-day T-bills accounted for 93,601crores and 364-day T-bills accounted for 90,409crores in 2011-12. With regard to secondary market, Government securities outright deals settlement stood at 34,88,203crores for 2010-12 while corporate bonds were only about one-sixth of the same at about 5 91 979crores. In terms of liquidity, Government securities market is far ahead of corporate bonds. This may be due to regulatory provisions for Banks to hold Government securities as per their Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) requirements as well as preference for holding risk free sovereign assets as a part of diversification mechanism and liquidity management as Government securities have a highly liquid repo market. Though repo in corporate bonds is permitted in India for last few years, only 4 trades have been reported on the said market. Investors' preference for holding sovereign assets in India vis-à-vis corporate bonds reflects the weak credit risk management structure in India which may be due to some of the weak legal provisions in regard to credit protection and delay in disposal bankruptcy cases.
Most of the issuers of the bonds are typically Public Sector Units predominantly owned and controlled by the Government. These entities find it easier to sell their bonds as they are also perceived as sovereign entities with tacit and perceived guarantee on such borrowings. This provides an immense comfort to the investors with respect to possible bankruptcy that may require higher provisioning. Investing in these entities is a workaround to avoid legal impediments (Khanna & Varottil, 2012) . Major bonds issuances in India are done through private placement route. The private placement route requires little disclosures as the market is confined to qualified institutional investors and cheaper vis-à-vis public issuances. The private placement document is generally a brief document that gives brief details of the issue and the company issuing the bond. As per RBI requirement for Banks investing in the said bonds, investing banks must have the copy of the private placed document along with the bond. After such RBI notification, the private placement documents started to carry more information that is useful to bond investors. Public issue of debt has been tried out in few cases in recent times but the same is less cost effective vis-à-vis private placement. SEBI has, of late, made many investor and issuer friendly changes to public issuance of debt but the same has not been the preferred route as investors are limited to banks and institutions. Unlike a prospectus for public issuances, private placement does not require any statutory disclosure. Since retail investors are absent in this form of the market, private placement has remained the most preferred route for issuers. Since bonds are privately placed with institutional investors, the secondary market liquidity is limited as most of the investors generally hold the bonds till maturity as they have already assumed the risk and the bonds are held in the mark to market category of investment (Held for Trading).
Sound Indian firms have been trying to raise resources through bonds sell in international markets. These issuances have been done through ECB and FCCB route. The ECB guidelines put restrictions amount to be borrowed, cost of such borrowing, tenure and end-use while FCCB comes under FDI regulations and gives advantages to the issuers. FCCBs allow for convertibility which make is attractive to both issuer and investor. ECB does not allow convertibility. Strong and financially sound companies have raised resources through ECBs, while FCCBs have been issued by companies across the spectrum (Babu & Sandhya, 2009) . These issuances are also in the nature of private placement but they are not locally issued. A falling market does not augur well for FCCB market as few investors will convert their bonds into equities. In 2011-12, most of the international bond issuances by Indian companies have been done through ECB route. During 2011-12, only 12 c o m p a n i e s i s s u e d F C C B a m o u n t i n g US$1.067billion while there were 1060 ECB issues with US$33.90billion (US$34.90billion including ECB (Bonds) route (US$1billion)).
The investors in the corporate bond market are predominantly banks and institutions including FIIs with very little or negligible part played by retail investors. Most of the investors prefer to invest in Sovereign bonds rather than corporate bonds due to the risk factor and legal impediments discussed in this paper. Pension Funds and Insurance companies prefer Government securities as they have to provide safe and guaranteed returns. Further unavailability of risk transfer mechanism in the corporate bond market also works as a deterrent. The secondary market in corporate bonds is fraught with many issues:
• (Table 4) .
Top 10 issuers were large companies and the largest issuer accounted for 10% of the issuances (value). Top 5 issuers accounted for about 33% of the issues Table 5 ). The large issuers have issued multiple bonds/papers during the year. These companies had multiple issues during the year. There were only 18 issues which had more than 100 investors and the rest were having less than 100 investors.
• Settlement: Till recently, investors had to settle their deals directly among themselves. Now the investors need to settle their deals through a clearing house.
• Information Dissemination: Warehousing of information is very important for corporate bond investors. Centralized information regarding issue size and other important details like optionality, etc. should be publicly available. Such information is not easily available making it difficult for investors to source appropriate information.
• Credit Migration History: It is necessary for bond investors to have information on credit migration history of a company in a centralized place. Though rating agencies provide such information individually whenever there is a Credit event, but it is difficult to source all information together to effectively price a corporate bond.
• Corporate Bond Yield Curve: Unlike sovereign bonds, there is no corporate bond yield curve dissemination and hence it is difficult to price non-traded bonds in the portfolio. FIMMDA announces the credit spread for each rating class and each issuer class which is required to be used by investors. Since no credible study has been undertaken to test those credit spreads, it is difficult to use them effectively for pricing corporate bonds.
• Probability of Default: Given the lack of credible data on corporate bonds, it is extremely difficult to find out the probability of default for corporate bonds. About 2288 issues (60% of the total issues) with about 34% of value had only while more than 99% of the issues with 97% of issuance value had only upto 49 investors as required under the legal provisions for private placement (Table 6 ). So there has been concerted effort to issue the instruments through private placement route than the public issuances.
Challenging Issues:
Issues upto 1 year of maturity accounted for 65% of the total issuance value while 2 to 3 months issues accounted for 27% and long term issues like 5 years and above accounted for about 26% of the issue amount. The 5 year segment was dominated by Banks and infrastructure companies. About 50% of the issues had maturity of 6 months or less (Table 7) .
The largest issuer company raised 82% of the funds through issuances on daily basis by one issuance in a day while only 2% have been raised through 4 issues in a day (13% raised through 2 issues in a day and 3% was raised through 3 issues in a day). Average maturity of the instruments issued were only 94 days with average number of investors per issue at only 2.
If the current market outcome follows the 2007-08 patterns, then we can safely comment that the market has a long way to go if we have to bring liquidity to the market. This type of market will be risky for investors as it misses the most important link -long term nature of the market. The granular data should be available in public domain to make comparative analysis of market maturity so that the bonds can be effectively priced by investors considering the risk involved in the market. Unavailability of information makes this more costly as any investor would expect higher return for the inefficient microstructure risk.
The paper tries to understand the current market dynamics from both primary market issuances and secondary market trading
single investors
Source: Author's private calculation
Market Dynamics:
Primary Issuances: Out of 18 perpetual bonds, only 5 were rated "A" while others were rated "AA". All these perpetual bonds had "Call" option at the expiry of 10 year subject to the approval of RBI. Financial companies (NBFCs included) accounted for a large chunk of issuers with 69% market share followed by infrastructure companies with 11% market share in number of issuances (Table 8 ).
The issuance statistics shows that most of the issuances are upto 3 years of maturity (61%). The minimum maturity is 0.01 years and maximum is for 20 years, with average issuance maturity of 4.14 years. Bonds in 10 years maturity bucket accounted for about 9% ( From the information, we could make out that some of these issues were rated by Rating Agencies (as their names have been given in the data) but the Rating of the issue is not provided in the data released in public domain. Only 8 issues were unrated issues in the data (Table 10) . During 2011-12, there were 1463 bond issuances for which coupon/implied yield could be extracted from the data in order to study behavior of cost of funding for various groups of issuers. Two records were dropped from the dataset as its coupon was stated to be 0.01% and 0.001% finally making the dataset to be 1461. The bond issuers were classified into various groups according to their business activity. It was found that Banks issued bonds with the lowest average yield of 9.92%, with an average maturity of 7.39 years, while Services companies (mainly PSU units like Electricity Boards, etc.) could raise funds at cheaper rates at 10.07% and while infrastructure companies issued bonds with an average coupon of 13.03% with maturity of 4.09years. Surprisingly, infrastructure companies issued bonds with lesser maturity as against manufacturing companies and banks. This may be due to the fact most of the housing / building construction companies have raised funds during the year and due to the depressed market conditions prevailing in the market, these companies were perceived as more risky. Banks were considered the safest investment class by the investors in terms of the Relative Risk Indicator (Table-11 ).
A granular analysis of the data shows that there is substantial difference in yields between bonds of various rating grades. The difference between yield of AAA and AA bonds in infrastructure companies and Banks were comparatively lower vis-à-vis other group of issuers. (Table -12 ) Rating is an important parameter for corporate bond risk premia. Higher rated bonds typically warrant lower coupon than low rated bonds. We have taken bonds for which rating information were available (1286 bonds) and tried to find out the structure of risk premia for each rating class. We found that bond investors determine price of bonds on the basis of rating information. It is also observed that market is obsessed with AAA and AA rated bonds as an investment class and hence the coupon is significantly lower as investors consider them safer investments. Other rating categories have reasonable risk premia (Table 13) .
We have tried to understand if the market has been efficiently pricing the bond issuances by looking at the cost of funding. Cost of funding (coupon of the bond) will depend on many factors of riskmaturity, optionality, Rating class, type of issuer, etc. The regression equation used for finding out the relationships is:
We did not find any significant relationship of coupon with optionality of the bond. The regression found that the Rating has significant relationship with coupon. Lower rating demanded higher coupon as the relationship shows (positive relationship as numerical value of lower rating is more than the numerical value of higher rating). The coupon/yield was having a negative relationship with the maturity. This means, the higher maturity bonds demanded relative lesser yield but lower maturity bonds demanded higher coupon/yield. This may be due to the fact that we had selected the year 2011-12 which witnessed unprecedented liquidity shortage and short term rates were higher than the long term rates in the market which has been captured in the regression results. We used dummy variables in the regression for type of issuers (Table-14) .
Source: NSDL, Author's private computation We tried to create different panels for various Types/Groups of bond issuers to estimate the relationship of coupon with other variables among the various classes of bond issuers (Table 15 ).
In case of Banks and Finance companies, we found that the embedded optionality was significant at 5% and 10% level respectively for determining the coupon/yield rate while for other groups, the same was not significant. However, for Banks, the relationship was negative while for Finance companies the relationship was positive. For Banks, higher coupon was paid for embedded bonds (Numerical value =1 in regression) while for Finance companies higher coupon was paid for nonembedded bonds (Numerical value =2 in regression). The results are justified because banks were considered safe bet for investment while Finance companies were considered relatively more risky and (-0.50) * significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10% Note: Numbers in (…) parenthesis are t-stat of the estimates and […] are standard error hence higher coupon were demanded by investors. Since bank bonds were considered safer assets and can be compared with sovereign securities (given the very low and negligible rate of Bank failures in India), any embedded option (mostly giving call rights to issuers) were considered more risky in comparison to bonds having no embedded options. Rating was found to be significant and the directions were same for all groups. With regard to maturity, it was found that the yield was indirectly related to maturity for Banks and infra companies (where it was found to be significant) validating our earlier findings of such relation due to high liquidity shortage in the market.
Corporate bond trading in the secondary market during 2011-12 is considered for analysis in this paper. Secondary market trading in corporate bonds is done in OTC environment but these trades are reported to multiple platforms NSE, BSE and FIMMDA. Currently FIMMDA runs F-TRAC platform that facilitates reporting of OTC deals in corporate bonds, CPs and CDs. However, RBI has mandated reporting of trades in CPs and CDs through F-TRAC platform but traders have choice of reporting of corporate bonds deals to BSE or NSE if the deal is done through brokers and if the traders are directly dealing, then they can report the deals to F-TRAC. Settlement (T+2) is done through one of the clearing corporations of the Exchanges. The reported deals data have many inherent problems non-standardized prices and yield reporting, information on Credit rating, names of the issuing companies, etc. The corporate bonds deals are concentrated in few issuers. Top 10 issuers account for about 56.50% of the total number of trades. In Top 10 category, we found that 9 companies belong to Government sector and only 1 was a private company (Table 16 ).
In order to understand how markets perceive risk while trading the bonds, we found that Banks are perceived as less risky and financial companies are considered relatively more risky while comparing their YTMs. In terms of their relative riskiness measured in terms of Yield to Time to Maturity ratio, Service Providing companies scored higher as the data contained many firms which are owned by Sovereign States (like Electricity boards, etc.). Manufacturing firms and Banks were close to each other. Infrastructure firms and other diversified groups like holding companies were considered very risky in terms of investment. The same result was also found in issuance structure of corporate bonds ( Table -17 ). To understand the dynamics of secondary market trading in corporate bonds, we had to clean the data set which contained insufficient information for many trades like missing Credit Rating information, negative yield, wrong price (some bonds had reported traded price of more than 200). During 2011-12, 16296 valid trades were reported to various platforms. There are apparent duplicate trades reported for the same securities in multiple platforms which were cleaned for analysis. This has to be done physically and after ascertaining if the same was a duplicate trade. The major trades were for fixed coupon bonds (16064 deals) and only a few deals were for floating coupon bonds (232 deals). We dropped 733 records for incomplete information though every effort was made to collect information from issuance data using the ISIN number as the key (like getting Rating information from issuance table for some bonds for which the same was missing in trading data). We had 15563 records finally with 40159 deals. However, we found that no systematic record exists for Rating Migration incorporation in the data for trading. The data cleaning was the most painful exercise for this study.
Secondary Market:
Trading in corporate bonds concentrated in AAA rated bonds which accounted 89% (81% of deals multiple deals in same bond) and 99% of the deals were in the first 3 A group rated securities (A, AA and AAA). We found that while trading, the market fairly prices the rating information even though the trading liquidity is very low in most of other rating class. To our surprise, we found that yield in BBB class of bonds were lower that A rated bonds. This may be possible due to two reasons: (a) the trading might have happened on days when the general yields in the market were relatively lower and (b) since the market is an OTC one, the dealing parties might have agreed to do the deal at that yield due to many other considerations. However, no specific conclusion can be drawn from the said yield abnormalities as the market is highly illiquid for BBB rated bonds vis-à-vis A rated bonds. The lower rated bonds (below investment class BB rated bonds), though only few trades happened, had to offer significant yield to investors (Table 18) .
With regard to trading behaviour of individual bonds, we found that few bonds were having relatively higher level of liquidity purely on the basis of their high incidence of trading. During the year, 1803 ISINs were traded with 40159 deals. One bond was traded on 180 days during the year (238 trading days in our sample). The most liquid ISIN (Table  19) .
We tried to understand if the yield of a bond is related to parameters like Rating, structures like Fixed or Floating, type of issuer, etc. We tried to estimate the regression model:
While estimating the above regression equation, we have used dummy variables for type of bond issuers and other diversified group was considered as Type 1 as it contained trades of bonds of only a single issuer. The relationship between yield and bond structure (fixed or floating) was found to be positive higher yield was expected for bonds with floating coupon (higher numerical rank for floating rate bonds=2 and fixed coupon bonds = 1). Investors demanded a higher premia for taking investment decision on bonds having floating rate which is fair. The relation between Rating class and yield was also found to be rational as higher yield were demanded on bonds with lower rating (higher numerical value assigned: AAA for 1, AA for 2, A for 3, BBB for 4 and BB for 5). Yield and Tenor showed a negative relation which was intuitively not correct (Table 20) .
We also created different Panels in terms of Type of issuers and looked at if yield is related to other variables in a rational manner across various types of bond issuers. For all cases, bond structure (floating or fixed coupon) was found to be significant except in case of Banks. As investors consider banks to be relatively less risky as close to sovereign structure (as incidence of actual bank failures in India is negligible), they did not differentiate between floating rate bonds and fixed coupon bonds. Rating has been found to be significant and in the right direction/sign for all class of bonds except for bonds issued by Services sector. Maturity was found to be related to coupon but the sign was found to be rational (Table 21 ).
Default risk of bonds is very important for investors in order to efficiently price the bond. In India, very little information is available on these areas. Credit spread information is provided by FIMMDA on daily basis for various rating category of bonds as well as for various category of issuers. The credit yield curves are neither estimated nor any corporate bond index is available in public domain. If spot yield curves for corporate bonds are made available, risk neutral probability of default can be easily estimated from these yield curve as sovereign spot yield curves are available from CCIL and NSE. From the trading information of corporate bonds (using only AAA bonds for estimation), we estimated the risk neutral probability of default. Using the traded bonds, we estimated the spot rates using Nelson-Siegel functional form :
The spot curves (using only AAA bonds) estimated from this exercise were used to estimate the one period forward rates at every year interval. We also used the CCIL spot rate param values for Government bond market to estimate the spot curve for sovereign securities market which are used to estimate the one period forwards at every year interval. These forwards are used to estimate the probability of survival. The probability of a bond to survive in one year (not getting into default) is given by
Where r is the sovereign forward yield for the term and k is the corporate forward yield of the same term. The probability of default is calculated as (1-Prob. of Survival). The cumulative probability of 6. Default Probability of Corporate Bonds: default is estimated as:
We estimated the same upto 10 years for 2011-12.
We found that the probability of default is higher at the shorter end and the same falls at the longer end (Table 22 ). The reason may be the uncertainty existing in the short term with respect to liquidity and other macroeconomic factors might be warranting higher probability of default to be factored in yields. We considered bonds upto 10 years as bonds, beyond 10 years are hardly traded in the market. Average issuances are also less than 10 years in India during 2011-12 (5.23 years).
The spot curves derived for both corporate and Government securities as explained in Section 6 are used to calculate the credit spread for each maturity term. We first calculated appropriate spot yield for each tenor starting from 1 year to 10 years for both Government securities and corporate bonds using the Nelson-Siegel functional form. Daily average credit spread was obtained for 2011-12 (238 trading days) and averaged for the month for smoothing effect (Chart -1). The average monthly spread varied between 108bps to 164bps though daily spreads were more volatile and varied between 87bps and 187bps ( Table -23 ). The average daily spread was 138bps and the median spread is 135bps (monthly averages were also almost the same). The correlation between the change in monthly average 10 year yield and monthly average credit spread was -0.82147.
Corporate Credit Spread:
While looking at the relationship between the credit spread of the liquidity measured by volume and/or number of deals during the day for the AAA bonds, we did not find any significant relationship between them either individually or volume of trades and number of deals together. The R-square was very low at 0.033. The credit spread for 2011-12 for AAA securities were close to a normal distribution (Table 24 and Chart -2).
We tried to find out if the credit spreads depend on past information on credit spreads. We found that lags beyond 2 days are not significant and they do not change the R-square of the estimated equation significantly. Hence, we restricted our estimation to only 2 lags. We also considered the change in the slope of the sovereign yield curve to see if the same has any effect on spread. The slope parameter was estimated as the difference between the 10 year and 3-months sovereign spot yields. We found that the The residuals were tested for their behavior and found to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 0.00077 (close to 0.1%). The Goodness of Fit tests for normal distribution for residuals were found to be acceptable (Table 25 and Chart -3).
The credit spread equation above was estimated as dependent variable with lag credit spreads (upto 2 lags) as independent variables. We found that lag credit spreads (upto 2 lags) are significant (Table  26 ). The Durbin-Watson statistics was higher at above 2. Market used the past spreads to price the credit spread they would charge on corporate bonds while trading in the market. After looking at the model yields for both corporate bonds and Government securities and estimating the probability of default as well as the behavior of theoretical spread, we also looked at actual trading yields of AAA rated securities and corresponding Government securities in terms of maturity and computed the spread as the difference between the corporate bond yield and the Government securities yield. We wanted to see if the daily change in spread has any relationship with the change in yield of the 10-year Government securities (Chart 4). We have considered 10-year Government securities in estimating the relationship as the same is relatively more liquid in Indian market and all corporate and credit products are benchmarked against the said 10-year Government securities yield. We found that the plot looks linear and hence we tried to fit a linear model to estimate the relationship.
The regression output shows some interesting results (Table 27 ). The observed corporate yield spread shows a negative relationship with the change in 10 year Government securities yield but with a low adjusted R-square. The observed yields of the corporate bonds (AAA) traded during 2011-12 were mapped with the 10-year Gilt yields as well as with the comparable Government securities yields on the trading day. Daily movement of changes in both AAA corporate bonds and 10 year Gilt yields as well as comparable Government securities were considered to understand if they move in tandem or not.
The positive correlation shows that they move together and have very high correlation. The same kind of result is also observed for the comparable Government securities yields.
The Indian corporate bonds issuance and trading data provides interesting information with regard to various parameters. The data handling is a challenging exercise as in many cases the important information for efficient pricing of bonds is missing in the data available in public domain. With regard to issuance and trading, AAA bonds dominated the market. With regard to their issuances, it is found that the coupon offered on AAA bond issuances is significantly lower as investors consider it as good as sovereign securities with only 12bps risk premia. We found that other rating categories have reasonable risk premia when they are issued to investors. The market does not trade much of lower rated bonds like A/BBB/BB. The secondary market is generally illiquid. We found that while trading, the market fairly prices the rating information even though the trading liquidity is very low in most of other rating class. Bonds issued by Banks were considered most safe investment by investors and investors were willing to pay for the same. We found that the probability of default is higher at the shorter end and the same falls at the longer end. The reason may be the uncertainty existing in the short term with respect to liquidity and other macroeconomic factors might be warranting higher probability of default to be factored in yields. The study also found that credit spreads behave in a rational manner. The market participants are using the past credit spread information upto 2 trading days lags to price the spread they would demand on the corporate bonds while investing in them. The change in credit spread is negatively linked to the change in 10-year Government bond yields. Change in AAA Yield
